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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a simple model of corporate financial
structure intended to formalize the macroeconomic concern over
excessive leverage. In particular, we attempt to rationalize why
firms designing an optimal capital structure would choose a level
of debt that leaves them heavily exposed to macroeconomic risk.
Our starting point is a variant of the "corporate control" model
often used to motivate debt as the optimal financial contract. We
modify this framework in two ways. First, we include common risks,
interpretable as business cycle risks, as well as idiosyncratic
risks. Second, we include corporate and investor-level taxes, and
consider the implications of a net tax bias against equity finance.
The tax distortion confronts firms with a tradeoff ex ante between
the costs of equity finance and the costs of increased exposure to
macroeconomic risk accompanying debt finance. In this regard, an
equilibrium with "excessive leverage" is possible. Further,
despite the possibility of renegotiation, debt is in general less
effective than equity in insulating the firm against aggregate
risk.
Our model leads to the prediction that individual firm
dividends may vary with macroeconomic conditions, even after
controlling for the effects of relevant firm-specific performance
measures, such as earnings. We present some formal econometric
evidence in support of this prediction, using a panel of individual
corporations. Evidence on some related predictions is also
presented.
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The significant rise In corporate borrowing In the 1980s has renewed
Interest both In the determinants of corporate leverage and in the
Implications of high leverage for macroeconomic stability. In the process, It
has stirred a lively debate. Many financial economists point to the benefits
of high leverage in restricting non-value—maximizing behavior by managers (see
for example Jensen, 1986, 1988). On the other hand, a number of
niacroeconomlsts have expressed concern over whether the Increased leverage
makes firms excessively vulnerable to a downturn (see for example Bernanke
and Campbell. 1988; and Friedman, 1986. 1990).
Underlying the macroeconomic concern is the Idea that, somehow, the
existing corporate financial structure Is not designed to Insulate firms
optimally against the risk of the business cycle. In this paper, we
develop a simple model of capital structure intended to formalize this
possibility. We attempt to rationalize why firms designing an optimal capital
structure may choose ex ante a level of debt that leaves them heavily exposed
to macroeconomic risk.
Our starting point is a variant of the "corporate control" model often
used to n)otivate debt as the optimal financial contract.1 We modify this
framework In two key ways. First, we include common risks to firms,
interpretable as business—cycle risks, as well as idiosyncratic risks.In
this kind of setting, incentive considerations dictate that the firm should
bear the idiosyncratic risk, but that the outside lenders should absorb the
aggregate risk. As a consequence, the optimal contract is no longer pure
debt, but a mixture of debt and equity, where equity is the mechanism through
1For a survey of corporate control models of debt, see Harris and Raviv
(1991).which the firm shifts (at least some of) the aggregate risk to Its creditors.
Second, we include corporate and Investor-level taxes, and consider the
implications of a net tax bias against equity finance. The tax distortion
confronts firms with a tradeoff ex ante between the costs of equity finance
and the costs of Increased exposure to macroeconomic risk accompanying debt
finance. In this regard, an equilibrium with "excessive leverage" is
possible. Further, despite the possibility of renegotiation, debt is never
effectively "equity in drag." As we demonstrate, even when costless
renegotiation is feasible, debt cannot in general perfectly substitute for
equity as a means of insulating a firms' real activities against aggregate
risk.
Our analysis differs from the traditional approach to studying debt and
taxes (e.g., Gordon and Malkiel, 1981) by emphasizing the distinction between
aggregate and idiosyncratic risks. Indeed, if the only risks to the firm are
idiosyncratic, then the tax bias against equity tax does not distort the
captial structure choice; pure debt finance is optimal for incentive reasons,
as well as tax reasons. Tax considerations confront the firm with a
meaningful tradeoff only when aggregate risks are present.2 We also differ
by explicitly considering whether the the possibility of renegotiation makes
the tax distinction between debt and equity irrelevent.
Perhaps the key element of our theory is the role of equity in permiting
firms to share aggregate risks with Its creditors, as way to minimize the
possibility of recession—induced financial distress. As we demonstrate, this
leads to the prediction that individual firm dividends may vary with
macroeconomic conditions, even after controlling for the effects of relevant
2Relatedly, while the tax bias distorts the firm's mix between debt and equity
finance, it is not essential to explaining the existence of debt. Corporate
control considerations serve this function.
2firm-specifc performance measures, such as earnings. We present some
formal econometric evidence in support of this prediction, using a panel of
indvldual corporations. Independently of firm—level variables, macroeconomic
conditions are significant predictors of dividends. These results are robust
to a variety of different proxies for macroeconomic conditions.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce the assumptions of the
basic model in section II, and then characterize the optimal financial
arrangement and equilibrium behavior in section III. To ease the exposition
we first develop the analysis under the assumption that renegotiation ofdebt
is arbitrarily precluded. We then drop this restriction, arid demonstrate that
the basic results remain unaffected. In section IV, we provide evidence on
two of the model's basic implications: the macroeconomic effect on individual
firm dividend policy, and the connection between captial structure and the
aggregate rate of Involuntary business liquidations. We also attempt to
quantify the role of equity in sharing aggregate risk by examining the
cyclical behavior of the "equity cushion," the ratio of dividends to interest
payments. Finally, we discuss the relation of the model to the increase in
corporate debt during the 1980s and, as well, to the recent trend away from
debt lnance. Concluding remarks are presented in section V.
II. THE FINANCIAL CONTRACTINGPROBLEM:SETTING
The model characterizes a sector of the economy consisting of many risky
firms that are identical ex ante. There are three periods --0,1, and 2.
Each firm operates a project that involves potentially three stages. One unit
of input is required in period 0. In period I, the option of suspending the
project arises. The liquidation value (in units of period 2 output) is w <1.
If instead the project is continued, it yields a random level of output In
3period 2.
There is a both an aggregate and an idiosyncratic component to project
risk. The aggregate shock Is realized In period 1, prior to the liquidation
decision.It Is summarized by a (common) success probability p. drawn from a
continuous probability distribution: p £[,p),with 0 < << 1;and H(p)
and h(p) are the respective cumulative distribution and density functions.
Presuming the project is not liquidated in period 1, the outcome of
idiosyncratic risk is then realized in period 2. Output for each project
equals y with probability p and 0 with probability 1 —p.Thus aggregate
conditions govern the period I conditional mean of period 2 output, equal to
py, while idiosyncratic factors govern the ex post realization about the mean.
We assume further that
y>w (1)
which, sinceis the lowest possible realization of p, implies that
liquidations are never socially efficient.
Each firm's objective is to maximize its expected discounted return. It
obtains financing In period 0 from risk-neutral lenders. Under symmetric
Information, the overall outcome is simple to characterize. As long as the
unconditional mean of project output exceeds the gross riskiess Interest rate
r (i.e, as long as 5 py h(p)dpr) it is optimal to Initiate the project.
Condition (1) ensures that the project should not be liquidated prematurely,
regardless of the realization of the aggregate state. Finally, financial
structure is irrelevant and indeterminate. Any security which offers lenders
an expected return equal to r will suffice.
To motivate a meaningful role for financial structure we introduce the
following agency problem. Suppose that after the aggregate state is realized
4in period 1, each firm has the option of secretly using the invested capital
for its own purposes. The period 2 payoff from this malfeasant behavior is i,
andis unobservable by outsiders. The trade off is that the misallocation of
funds guarantees an unsuccessful project outcome. This scenario is a simple
formalization of the story which Berle and Means (1932), Jensen (1986, 1988).
and others have used to motivate a divergence of objectives between




The significance of these two restrictions will be taken up later.
In period 0. each firm issues securities to lenders. The securities
specify (i) a decision rule for whether to liquidate or to continue after
period 1, and (Ii) a set of state—contingent payments. Observables upon
which the contract may be conditioned include the common shock p and, If the
project continues, the idiosyncratic output realizations. Importantly, It is
not possible to Include contingencies based on the allocation of Invested
capital, since this activity is not publicly observable.
To address tax considerations, we divide the set of feasible
state—contingent securities into two kinds: "debt' and "equity. The Internal
Revenue Service requires that to be classified as debt, a security must offer
an Interest obligation that is 'sum certain.' The standards imposed by the
sum certain requirement are somewhat vague since the tax code does permit debt
to Involve some risk. Roughly speaking, the security must offer (I) a fixed
payment, except in the event of distress; and (Ii) liquidation and seniority
5rights.3 With these considerations in mind, we assume that a debt contract
specifies a face value obligation D and a liquidation rule. The contract
gives the bondholders the right to liquidate whenever expected earnings are
below the point where the firm can credibly commit to managing the project
efficiently (see below).4 This amounts to specifying a reservation value for
the aggregate disturbance p; call it p0.If p <p0.the debtholders liquidate
the firm and receive the proceeds w (since they are senior claimants). If
instead p a p. production proceeds and the bondholders are paid D if the
5 outcome Is good and nothing if it is bad. Given that lenders are risk—
neutral, the expected payoff to debt must satisfy
(1—t)1fpDh(p)dp +H(p)wI =(l—t)ç(ir (4)
p0
where t Is the personal income tax rate and Is the fraction of the project
that is financed by debt.6
A commonly held view is that equity offers firms more flexibility than
debt in times of distress. We capture this idea by assuming that equity
3See the discussion in Bulow, Summers, and Summers (1990) and Gertler and
Hubbard (1990).
41n our formulation, debt is a two period contract.It is initiated In period
0; there is a call provision in period 1; and final payoffs (in the absence
of liquidation) occur In period 2. An equivalent and perhaps more realistic
formulation is to think of the financial arrangement as a sequence of one
period contracts. At the end of period 1, the bondholders decide whether to
roll over the debt for another period or sue for liquidation. The liquidation
rule Is based on the realization of p.
5it is straightforward to verify that it is optimal for creditors to receive 0
In the bad productivity state. We embed this result a priori simply to
conserve on algebra.
6We model taxes as being levied ongross returns for simplicity of exposition.
The results are not affected by imposing taxes on net returns.In the absence
of an investment model with long-lived capital, any assumptions about
depreciation for tax purposes would be somewhat artificial. To focus on the
capital structure issues central to our analysis, we avoid discussion of
depreciation accounting.
6payoffs may be indexed to the observable common shock. In particular, an
equity contract pays a "dividend" E" if the project outcome Is successful and
the realized aggregate state is p; and it pays nothing otherwise. Implicit in
Ihis formulation is that equltyholders have no liquidation or seniority
rights. To offer a competitive return, the expected return on equity must
satisfy
(1_ta) fp Eh(p)dp =(l—t)(l—')r (5)
p0
wherete is the personal tax rate on equity, and (l-) is the fraction of the
project financed by equity.
Each firm maximizes, net of taxes, expected final output minus payments
to bondholders and equityholders. This objective, V(p,D,E) is given by
V(p0,D,E) =(l_tc).1p(y—D)h(p)dp—S pEh(p)dp (6)
p0 p0
wheretc is the corporate tax rate. Equation (6) takes into account that
dividends are not deductible for corporate tax purposes. Further, since
transfers to the firm are taxable, it is required that
Vpp0
(7)
It is optimal to design the financial structure to eliminate the firms
incentive to misallocate the project input. This Is true since the firm's
gain from this activity, ij',isby assumption less than the project's
liquidation value, u.7'8 Accordingly, the following set of incentive
TEx ante it is preferable to arrange to liquidate when the firm has an
incentive to misallocate funds (as opposed to simply letting the firm
misallocate); expected project surplus is higher since u>v.
8We have assumed for simplicity that u and v do not vary with the aggregate
state. What is critical for our results is that u and vareless procyclical
than expected project earnings from operating honestly. For example, think
7constraints are relevant:
(I_tc) p(y— D)-pEa v, V p
p0
(8)
The left side of condition (8) s the firm's expected gain from honestly
proceeding with the project., crnditional on the aggregate state's being p.
The right side Is the gain from cheating. Note that condition (8) Implies a
separate incentive constraint associated with each aggregate state In which it
is feasible for the firm to continue operating (i.e., for each p a p ).This
is because the firm has the option of cheating after aggregate conditions are
known. It suggests that, excepting possibly for tax considerations, the






thena more compact statement of each firm's contracting and investment
problem is:
max 5p(y-D)h(p)dp-,f pxEh(p)dp (9)
{D,E,p p p0
subjectto
of the economy as consisting of a cyclical and a non-cyclical sector. Capital
may be shifted (at a cost) between sectors.
8$ p(fl+zE)h(p)dp+H(p)u=r (10)
p0
p(y -0—xE)a xv; p a p (11)
a 0; p ap (12)
0
andthe feasibility condition. p a.Equations(9), (11), and (12)
correspond to (6), (7), and (8). respectively. Equation (10) isobtained by
combining constraints (3) and (4) to eliminate .Theweights x and z reflect
the relative corporate and personal tax treatment of equity.
Since all firms are Identical ex ante and since r is given exogenously,
an equilibrium is defined by a vector (U, E', p0} that solves the above
problem. Ex post output per firm is py if p a p0. and it is 0 if p< p0.
In sction lilA below, we analyze the equilibrium when x =z.In this
benchmark case there is no tax bias against, equity; the effective surtax-on
equity at the corporate level is completely offset by the effective subsidyat
the personal level. We then turn in section IllS to the case where x exceeds
z, implying a net tax disadvantage to equity. For pedagogical purposes, we
begin by arbitrarily precluding renegotiation of debt; however, in section
IIIC we drop this restriction.
lilA. Case 1: No Tax Bias Against Equity (x =z1.Substituting equation
(11) into the objective (10) yields the following expression for the firm's
expected after—tax profit, fl(p):
fl(p) a ($pyh(p)dp +U(p)w-nIx (13)
p0
Maximizing expected profits thus corresponds to minimizing p.
The capital structure which minimizes p0 concentrates the firms
9obligations In good aggregate states, to the maximum extent feasible. Each
incentive constraint In equation (11) defines a ceiling on the sum of expected
debt and equity payments, one corresponding to each macroeconomic state p.
The "state p cel1ing equals the difference between expected output and the
gain from cheating, py -xv.Since this difference increases with p, the
ceiling is higher the better the aggregate state. The firm thus gains by
shifting its expected obligations to good aggregate states. Doing so allows
it to promise less to creditors in bad aggregate states, making it feasible to
operate at lower values of p. MInimizing p0 therefore implies offering to
creditors the maximum incentive-compatible expected payment in each state p
p. In any optimum (with p >), therefore,the "state p incentive
constraint binds.
The optimal value of p is computed simply by integrating over the
incentive constraints and making use of (10) to eliminate D and E from the
expression; it is accordingly the minimum p which solves
11(p) [1—H(p)]v (14)
The optimal p Is therefore the minimum value at which the firm's expected
gain from managing its investment honestly (the left side of equations (14))
exceeds its expected gain conditional on cheating.
Figure 1 illustrates the outcome. The ep (for "expected profit") curve
portrays !l(p), and the gc (for "gain from cheating") curves portrays El —
H(pflv.Both curves slope downward. Figure 1 portrays the optimum as the
minimum p a p at which the ep and gc curves intersect. For realizations of p
below p, it pays for the debtholders liquidate since the firm since has the
incentive to cheat if it Is allowed to proceed. If 11(p) a [1 —H(p)]v,the
first-best outcome is attainable. Since the ep curve lies above the gc curve
10atIn this case, it is feasible to set p0 equal to .Conversely,if TI()
is sufficiently smaller than (1 -H(2)1u.'then the epandgc curves need not
Intersect, implying that no solution exists for p0. In this instance, agency
problems preclude Investment altogether.
When the incentive constraints bind, the optimal financial structure is a
mixture of debt and equity, with equityholders absorbing the aggregate risk.
In the limiting case in which the firm just escapes liquidation (i.e., when p
=p)payments to equityholders are cut to zero. The expected obligation to
bondholder equals the maximum liability afforded by the Incentive constraint.
p0






Clearly, if p falls below p, the firm's expected debt liability exceeds the
ceiling permitted by the incentive constraint. In this situation, the
bondholders liquidate the firm and receive w.





E is clearly increasing In p; payments to equityholders vary positively with
macroeconomic conditions. The key point is that a "macroeconomic" effect on
dividends arises, operating independently of the firm's ex post earnings
performance.It arises because the primary role of equity here is to provide
the firm with insurance against changing aggregate conditions.
IIIB. Case II: Tax Bias Against Equity (x )z).We now suppose that x
exceeds z, reflecting a net tax bias against equity. It turns out that in
IIthis situation firms effectively choose between two different financing
regimes. One is the kind of mixed debt-equity structure described in the
previous section. The other is exclusive use of debt. We describe each
possibility, in turn.
The outcome In the mixed debt-equity regime has the same structure as the
previous case. Equations (14), (15), and (16) still determine p. D, and E.
The only difference is that rT(p0) Is now given by equation (17), rather than
equation (14):
H (p ) =[Spy h(p)dp + H(p )w -nix-[(x—z)/x)J'pE h(p)dp (17)
0 p 0 p
0 0
Expected profits now Incorporate the impact of the effective surtax on equity,
reflected In the second term in equation (17). A rise in the tax wedge
(x —z)/x,holding x constant, ultimately increases the firm's exposure to
aggregate risk. p increases because the added cost of equity induces
greater reliance on debt.In terms of Figure 1, the reduction in expected
profits owing to the rise In (x —z)/xshifts the ep curve dowrward, raising
p0.
The tax subsidy opens the possibility that the firm may opt for pure
debt. Let pd denote the the reservation value of p for this case. To compute
the optimum under pure debt, note that only the state Incentive constraint
may bind. Since debt may not be indexed to the aggregate state, the incentive
constraints for p > pd are always slack. Combining the state p incentive
constraint with the pure debt version of equation (10) implIes pd is given by
fld(d)(d/:)[1 -H(pd))v (18)
9Note that the tax wedge, (x —z)/x,is just 1 —t(l_te)(i_tc)/(1_t)),the net
tax subsidy to debt finance often analyzed in the public finance literature.
12d
where p Is the expectation of p conditioned on pp. and with expected
d d
profits. TI (ps), defined by
fld(d) =(5 pyh(p)dp + — nIx (19)
°
Figure2 illustrates the trade off between the pure debt and mixed
regimes. The epCandgcd curves portraytheleft and right sides of equation
(18), respectively. The optimum under pure debt finance corresponds
to the intersection of these two curves with the lowest value of The
optimum under mixed debt—equity finance is portrayed the same way as in Figure
1, except that the epcurvenow reflects equation (17) rather than equation
(13). Exposure to macroeconomic risk is always greatest under pure debt
finance; that is, p >p0
in Figure 2.10 A fully levered firm faces a greater
prospect of liquidation because it is unable to concentrate its obligations In
good aggregate states. A firm may nonetheless opt for pure debt. Recause of
the tax asymmetry, ndI:p may still exceed 11(p).
Factors beyond the tax wedge affect the capital structure choice. A rise
in either the mean project return or in the project liquidation value
increases the relative attractiveness of debt. The same is true for a
reduction in macroeconomic risk. As the macroeconomic risk converges to zero,
pure debt finance becomes optimal: Though the idiosyncratic risk mayremain
large, both incentive and tax considerations dictate that the optimal contract
is pure debt. This kind of result differs from the traditional public finance
literature, which does not distinguish the significance of aggregate versus
idiosyncratic risk.
1°It is straightforward to verify that the gap between the gcandepdcurves
always exceeds the corresponding gap between the gcandepcurves,implying
that must always exceed p.
13IIIC. The Possibility of Renegotiation.If p falls below p, each firm
and its debiholders may be willing to renegotiate a deal that permits the
project to continue.In this subsection we reconsider the contracting problem
In light of this possibility. As we will demonstrate, the basic insights from
the previous analysis remain intact.
Assume that upon threat of liquidation, firms are able to make
take-It—or-leave-it offers to debtholders. Giving bargaining power to firms
in this situation Is in accord with how Chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy code
influences bargaining positions for debt renegotiation (see the discussion in
Gertner and ScharfsteIn, l989).i This assumption is mainly for convenience
of exposition, however. It turns out that the division of ex post bargaining
power does not affect the optimal reservation value of p. Nor does it affect
the division of expected surplus between the firm and Its lenders. Also, for
pedagogical purposes, assume there is no subsidy to debt finance, i.e. ,x=z:
Extension to the case with x > z Is straightforward.
Define p as the value of p at which the expected return to debtholders
conditional on not liquidating equals their gain from liquidating, i.e., the




If p p. renegotiation never occurs and the equilibrium corresponds
exactly to the case where renegotiation Is arbitrarily precluded. Suppose
that p lands below p .Sincep < p ,pD< w.The liquidation value thus
0 0 r
exceedsany feasible expected return on renegotiated debt. This is true since
That for some period (a minimum of 120 days) the debtor in possession has
control of the firm's assets and the exclusive right to offer plans for
reorganization implies that claims are realigned In favor of Inside equity.
14the firm cannot make an offer exceeding D without violating the incentive
constraint. Bondholders will therefore never opt to renegotiate. Equations
(14) through (16) thus continue to characterize the outcome. Figure 3a
illustrates this case.
Now suppose p0 >p.Bondholders will renegotiate if p lands in the
interval (p,p0), since p a implies pD a w.In this situation, the firm
offers bondholders an expected return equal to their reservation price w for
the right to continue. Since the offer is "take it or leave it," the
bondholders accept. Renegotiation thus alters the outcome in this case by
12
making r the effective reservation value of p. Note, however, that
inefficient liquidations may still occur since bondholders will refuse to
renegotiate whenever p falls below p. Equation (3) Implies that p >p'°
thatinefficient liquidations can still occur with positive probability.
Figure 3b illustrates this case.
Financial distress here cannot be resolved in this case by simple
conversion to equity, an oft-proposed solution. Resolving distress
instead requires a net transfer from the bondholders to the firs. The firm's
expected obligation must be reduced to the point where It no longer has an
incentive to misallocate. Bondholders may not be willing to do this,
especially if their gain from liquidation is relativelylarge.13
12The solutions for p,rJ and E remain the same In this case. Because they
still receive w whenever p p ,bondholdersexpected return remains 5pDh(p)
0 p0
+H(p)w.The constraints (10) -(12)thus remain unaffected. The only
difference in the contracting problem Is that fl(p )replaces1I(p ) as the
r 0
objective since the firm gets the expected surplus py —wfor all p C EPrPO)
It is straightforward to verify that equations (14) -(16)still determine
D, and E.
13Note also that our analysis overstates the likelihood of successful
renegotiation by abstracting from a number of the practical problems. See our
(1990) paper for a discussion of the effective costs of renegotiating
15IV. EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS
In this section we examine some empirical predictions of the model.
Perhaps the key feature of our theory is the role of equity as a means of
sharing aggregate risks. This leads to the prediction that payments to
equityholders should vary with macroeconomic conditions, everything else equal
regarding the firms performance (see equation (16)). In section IVA below we
present some formal evidence supporting the notion of an independent
macroeconomic effect on dividends. Another important implication, related to
the role of equity in sharing aggregate risks, involves the connection between
corporate capital structure and the cyclical behavior of business failures; we
address this issue in section IVB.In section IVC we present some facts on
the relative cyclical patterns in dividends and interest payments as a way to
quantify the historical importance of equity as a cushion against cyclical
risks. This exercise also allows us to draw quantitative Inferences about the
recent shift to leverage for the equity cushion. Finally, in section IVDwe
assess at a qualitative level whether our model Is compatible with the
Increase in corporate debt during the 1980s by taking account the behavior of
taxes and other factors affecting the choice of debt In our model.
IVA. The Macroeconomic Effect on Dividends. We now test the prediction
of equation (16), that macroeconomic conditions should influence payments to
equityholders, even independently of the firm's earnings performance. We
confront a number of issues in performing this test. First, and most
significantly, our model is too stylized to take to directly to data. We
therefore adopt an econometric specification designed to capture the basic
idea. We modify a conventional empirical dividend model to allow for the
possibility of a macroeconomic effect. Second,since how 'macroeconomic
corporate debt in the U.S.
16conditions' should be measured Is an open question, we use a variety of
measures. Finally, it is important to control for the possibility that
macroeconomic variables may matter statistically simply because they contain
news about future earnings performance that is not already containedin
firm-specific variables. We approach this problem in two ways: first, when
possible, by only allowing the macroeconomic variables to enter one period
lagged after the firm-specific variables; second, by allowing the firm's
contemporaneous stock price to enter.
The data we use are annual and consist of information on a panel on on
manufacturing corporations drawn from Standard and Poor's C01'PUSTAT industrial
file from 1970 to 1989.
The econometric framework is a a variant of Lintner's (1956) famous
partial adjustment framework. We experiment with specifications of the
form
SD =a +bY+cH +e (21)
t. I Itt It
S
where D is the desired dividend payout, with I and t denoting the firm and
the time period, respectively; a is fixed firm effect; Y1 reflects firm
specific economic variables that influence the pay out decision; reflects
macroeconomic variables that influence the payoutdecision14; ande1 is a
white—noise error term. All firm—specific variables are expressed in per
share terms.
15
14Strictly speaking, our model only makes predictions about adjustments in the
total present value of dividend payouts in the wake of a change in
macroeconomic conditions, as opposed to predictions about exact timing.
However, all that is necessary for our empirical predictions Is thatat least
some of the adjustment in dividends closely follows the movementin
macroeconomic conditions.
15A logical alternative Is to use logs of the relevant variables. In the
COMPUSTAT data, unfortunately, there are sufficiently many negative
observations for key firm-specific variables, such as earnings, to make this
17Following the literature, we assume partial adjustment of dividends:16
D —D =X(D -D ) (22) It i,t—I it i.,t—i
Using (21) to eliminate D In (22) and then first differencing to remove
firm—specific effects yields
AD =(l—A)AD +AbAY+AcAM+c (23)
It i,t—1 It t It
wherec =A(e -e
it It I,t—1
We take as the null hypothesis the conventional Lintner—type model, with
c =0.The alternative we offer, suggested by equation (16), is that c
should differ from zero; that is, everything else equal regarding the firm's
performance, dividends should vary with macroeconomic conditions.
There are two ways In which to interpret equation (23). One is as a
structural model. The other, which we prefer, Is simply as a reduced form.
Our strategy then should be interpreted as testing whether macroeconomic
factors should matter in the reduced form, after controlling for all the
relevant firm—specific variables.
We use two kinds of proxies for macroeconomic conditions. The first is
set of year dummies. This effectively amounts to allowing for a time varying
intercept which is common across firms, and interpreting movements in the
intercept as the "macroeconomic effect." Using year effects allows us to be
agnostic about the source of aggregate shocks relevant to dividend behavior.
It also allows us to abstract from problems of timing and measurement error.
The disadvantage is that it does not provide us with a precise metric against
which to judge the extent to which movements in the intercept are truly driven
choice unattractive.
16See also the review of studies In Poterba (1987).
18by macroeconomic factors. The second approach, therefore, is to include a
macroeconomic variable directly in the regression.
We begin with a set of regressions that use year dummies to reflect
macroeconomic conditions, The term XcM In equation (23) is treated as as
time—varying intercept. We then estimate three different versions. The first
uses contemporaneous firms earnings per share, E, as the measure of the
firm—specific effect on the desired dividend pay out, Y.17 The second adds
the contemporaneous firm stock price per share, S, to the set of firm
specific variables to control for the possibility that the year dummy is
simply contains news about the firm's fortunes that is not reflected in the
its current earnings. The last version controls for the possible influence of
tax changes on the estimated year effects. We allow the dividend payout
parameter conditioned on firm—specific events (b in equation (23)) to vary
with the tax price of dividends at the shareholder level. That Is, we let
b=b +bTAX (24)
0 1 t.
where TAX Is the ratio of the after—shareholder—tax value of a one-dollar
18
dividend payout to the after—shareholder-tax value of a capital gain. This
specification allows for the possibility that an additional common effect,
from the tax system, influences payout. An increase In the tax rate on
dividend distributions relative to the effective tax rate on capital gains
decreases TAX. We estimated hybrids of these three versions, but since they
17lJsing lagged earnings instead of contemporaneous earnings in estImating (23)
produces virtually identical results. We opted for contemporaneous rather
than lagged earnings to ensure that the firm-specific variable contains as
much news as possible about future earnings.
18That Is, TAX =(l—8)/(1-c),where 0 and c are average effective shareholder
tax rates on dividends and capital gains, respectively. To calculate TAX, we
updated the series reported in Poterba (1987).
19do not suggest any important changes, we do not report the results.
Table I and Figure 4 report the results for the three regressions using
the year effects as the macroeconomic variable. Table I presents the
estimated coefficients and significance levels for the firm—specific variables
in each regression, and also reports the significance level of the year
dummies.19 Figures 4a -4cplot the estimated year effects for each of the
three cases.
The year effects are highly significant in each case, indicating the
presence of a statistically significant common effect on dividends, after
controlling for the influence of conventional firm—specificfactors.2°
Importantly, the estimated patterns In the year effects are procyclical,
rising in upturns and falling In downturns. And this pattern holds across
specifications.In all three cases, pronounced troughs occur in 1975 and
1983, the wakes of the two previous recessions.It Is also true that a dip
occurs in 1987, not a recession period. However, GNP growth was below trend
in the latter part of 1986, IndIcating less than desirable macroeconomic
performance.
19Because the model is a reduced form, we restrict our interest to whether the
macroeconomic effect is significant, and forego any attempt to interpret the
coefficients on the firm-specific variables. Note also that the possible
auto—correlation in the error term, which is a consequence of the differencing
to remove the firm—specific effect, is likely to bias the coefficient on
lagged dividends. It does not, however, bias the estimated macroeconomic
effect.
20Though we do not report them here, we found similar results using a probit
specification to model dividend cuts. The probit specification was motivated
by the idea that dividend cuts may be reasonably approximated as discrete
events. We modeled the probability of a dividend cut as a function of
percentage changes in firm earnings and the stock price and year effects. The
firm—specific variables were statistically significant with the Intuitive
effect (Increases in firm earnings or stock prices reduce the probability of a
dividend cut). But, importantly, the year effects were also statistically
significant and countercyclical in magnitude: Holding constant firm—specific
influences, the probability of a dividend cut rises in recessions. The
results hold whether dividend cuts are modeled as nominal or real.
20As a way to confirm our- interpretation that. aggregate conditions are
responsible for the estimated patterns in the year effects, we reestimate the
three versions of the model, this tine using a macroeconomic variable, the
percentage change in real GNP, instead of the year dummies. The macroeconomic
variable is entered lagged one period, along with contemporaneous values of
the firm-specific variables. We use the lagged value of the macroeconomic
variable to minimize the possible news effect. The lag specification also
seems reasonable given that it takes time for precise information about GNP to
unfold (especially given data revisions).
Table 2 presents the results. The coefficient on the lagged percentage
change in GNP is positive across the three specifications, and precisely
estimated. The estimated coefficient is robust to the three specifications.
These results confirm that the common effect present in the first set of
regressions is connected with the business cycle. We also tried two
alternative variables to proxy macroeconomic conditions, corporate profits and
the unemployment rate, and found similarly that these variables had
significant predictive In the dividend regression.
Conventional models of dividend behavior cannot easily explain these
results. Models which predict simply that dividends vary with earnings cannot
explain an independent macroeconomic effect. These models predict only that
dividends should vary positively with firm-specific measures of profitability.
To the extent it is possible to control for all of the relevant firm-specific
factors, macroeconomic variables should not have independent predictive power.
Dividend models based on signaling theories do not in general yield this
result.21 Taking these models literally, a firm a firm needs onlyto signal
21Bhattacharya(1979) is a seminal paper on the signaling theory of dividends.
In a different vein, Easterbrook (1984) has suggested that periodic payments
to equltyholders serve as a mechanism for exposing managers to capital-market
21about its performance relative to the mean. Because information about common
movements in firm profitability is publicly available, there is no reason to
use dividends to signal changes in aggregate conditions. Hence, there is no
reason for an Independent macroeconomic effect on dividend behavior.
IVB. Involuntary Business Liquidations. Whenever p drops below p,
debtholders sue to liquidate the firm. Our model therefore predicts that
Involuntary liquidations should be countercyclical. Further, given that p is
determined jointly with financial structure, the model also predicts a
relation between financial structure and the pace of involuntary liquidations.
Equation (15), in particular, predicts a positive relation between debt and
the expected number of involuntary liquidations (holding constant output
conditional on success, y, and the gain from cheating, v).
A frictionless model could explain countercyclical voluntary business
exits, but it cannot explain countercyclical involuntary liquidations,
particularly if they involve efficiency costs, as they do endogenously in our
model. Because the Modigliani—Miller theorem holds in a frictionless setting,
this kind of framework also has difficulty explaining how an increase in
leverage could induce a rise in the business failures. These predictions are
easily generated, of course, in a model that arbitrarily restricts the form
that financial contracts can take, say to non—Indexed debt. Typically,
though, any predictions about debt and the cyclical behavior of liquidations
disappear once one permits the financial contracts to be indexed to aggregate
variables. A satisfactory model of recessions and financial distress must
provide some rationale for why this indexing does not emerge.In our
framework, institutional features of the tax code play an explicit role in
discipline to avoid non-value-maximizing uses of Internal funds. This
approach also does not predict an independent macroeconomic effect on
dividends.
22dampening the Incentive index financial contracts to aggregate cyclical
variables, effectively by dampenin.g the incentive to use equity.
Figure 5 plots times-series data for the postwar on liabilities of
business failures as fraction of GNP, taken from Dun and l3radstreet. (See
Friedman (1990) for a related discussion of these data.) Unfortunately, the
failure data do not separate involuntary from voluntary exits.22 Thus, while
the pattern is clearly countercyclical, this evidence alone Is not
inconsistent with a perfect—markets setting. However, as Friedman (1990) has
observed, there Is a dramatic shift in the failure rate that coincides with
the increase In corporate leverage. The ratio of liabilities of business
failures to GNP increases more than fourfold over the 1980s, despite the
sustained business expansion that begins in 1983. A perfect-narkets model
would have difficulty explaining such a sharp change in the business failure
rate, as well as the strong correlation of this change with the Increase in
corporate leverage.
The rise In the failure rate also casts doubt on the view that most
corporate debt is effectively "equity in drag." The potential for
renegotiation alone does not Imbue debt with all the effective features
equity. As our model suggests, even when costless renegotiation is feasible,
debt may not perfectly supplant equity as a device for sharing aggregate
risks.
IVC. The Equity Cushion We now present some evidence on the cyclical
behavior of dividends relative to interest payments. The objective is to gain
some quantitative sense of the degree to which equity Is used for sharing
aggregate risk. This exercise also leads us to a measure of financial
23Dun and Bradstreet defines a "failure" as the exit of a business Involved
in court proceedings or an exit by voluntary actions involving losses to
creditors.
23distress supplementary to the ratio of interest payments to cash flow, the
measure suggested by Bernanke and Campbell (1988) and others.
FIgure 6 plots the level of dividends relative to net interest payments,
using the quarterly postwar NIPA data. The most Immediate feature Is the
secular decline in this ratio, owing to the shift to debt finance. The mean
value is 2.53 over the postwar period, but shrinks to 0.81 over the decade of
the 1980s. For comparison, we also plot the ratio of cash flow to interest,
the Inverse of the 'Bernanke-Campbell' ratio. Not surprisingly, the secular
behavior of these two ratios Is closely related: The raw correlation is .974.
To isolate the cyclical from the secular movement in dividends relative
to interest we apply the detrending procedure suggested by Hodrick and
Prescott (1980). Figure 7 plots the detrended series. Pronounced troughs
appear around 1958, 1970, 1975, and 1982, times which either precede or
coincide with NBER dated recessions.23 In assessing the aggregate risk sharing
role of equity, the last three episodes are probably the most comparable,
since the secular value of the dividend to interest ratio was relatively
stable over this period (see Figure 6). In the last three episodes, the ratio
of dividends to interest fell about 257..
To gauge the the relative size of the cycical variation in the
dividend—to—interest ratio, we also report the similarly detrended ratio of
cash flow to interest. Naturally, troughs also occur around recession periods
in this series. Judging from the last three episodes, they are slightly less
than twice the size In percentage terms of the drop in dividends relative to
interest. This accords with the raw correlation between the two detrended
15The behavior of the dividend-interest ratio is robust to using lagged
interest payments in the denominator; hence contemporaneous fluctuations in
short-term nominal interest rates are not accounting for the cyclical
movements in the series.
24ratios, which is .603. Presuming that total interest obligations are
relatively stable over the cycle, these results suggest that, historically,
roughly over half of the cyclical drop in corporate cash flows was met by a
drop in dividends. Taken in conjunction with our earlier results that
indicate that dividends respond to macroeconomic conditions independently of
firm—level variables, this evidence suggests that the aggregate risk sharing
role of equity may be considerable.
The ratio of dividends to interest supplements the use of the ratio of
interest payments to cash flow as a measure of financial distress. In this
regard, the secular decline in the "equity cushion" is another symptom of the
financial vulnerability of firms. Given that this ratio has fallen to about
0.6, and given the historical magnitude of declines in this ratio during
recessions, it is clear that corporations face greater exposure to
macreconomic risk. These arguments, of course, hinge on the interpretation
of "debt's being debt,' and not effectively 'equity in drag. Our model
suggests, however, that debt in general never perfectly substitutes for equity
as vehicle for sharing aggregate risks.24
IVD. The Increase in Corporate Debt. Finally, is our simple model
compatible with the debt build—up of the 1980s? Obviously, the model is too
stylized to make quantitative statements. However, three events occurred In
the 1980s, each which would lead to increased use of debt in the context of
our model. The first was a rise in the tax subsidy to debt. However, while
the combined effect of the 1981 and 1986 tax reforms probably increased the
tax bias against equity finance, it is unlikely that this effect alone was
24lnnovations over the last decade have increased the flexibility of debt. Our
argument is only that, while debt may now be a closer substitute for equity as
a device to share aggregate risk, it cannot become a perfect substitute so
long as the institutional restrictions of the tax code remain.
25large enough to provide a complete explanation (see Gordon and HacKle-Mason,
1990; and our 1990 paper.)
Another possible factor is improved macroeconomic conditions.In our
framework, a rise in either the mean of the aggregate shock or a reduction in
the risk (i.e., a mean—preserving 'narrowing" of the distribution) reduces the
need for equity, thereby increasing firms' incentives to take advantage of the
tax subsidy to debt. To the extent the business expansion of the 1980s is
captured by this simple abstraction for improvement in macroeconomic
conditions, our framework would suggest that it provided a climate conducive
to growth in debt finance. This explanation is also compatible with the fact
that many firms have begun shifting back to equity finance in the recent
period of deteriorating aggregate economic conditions.
A final possibility is the improved liquidity of corporate assets owing
to the relaxation of antitrust laws and the increased participation by foreign
investors, as suggested by Shielfer and Vishny (1990). In our model, an
increase In firms' liquidation value similarly makes debt more attractive by
reducing the risk. An additional effect is that debtholders' Incentive to
renegotiate declines, possibly raising the cyclical sensitivity of involuntary
business liquidations (see the discussion in section lIC). Thus, the story is
capable of explaining both a rise in debt and an increase in the pace of
business failures.
It is difficult, however, to separate entirely the latter two
explanations of debt growth from tax considerations. Both improvement In
macroeconomic conditions and In firm liquidation values potentially reduce the
agency costs of external finance in our framework. Absent the institutional
considerations of the tax code, however, these factors cannot explain why
firms would choose to increase their exposure to macroeconomic risk.If they
26did not have to forego the tax subsidy, the firms in our model would always
opt for a financial structure with greater insulation against, aggregate risks.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our model, we think, is in keeping keeping with the WaJJ Street Journal
intuition that equity provides firms with a cushion against aggregate
fluctuations, and, relatedly, that firms are more likely to cut dividends in
recessions, when other firms are doing the same, everything else equal
regarding their earnings performance. Specifically, equity in our model
allows a firm to share aggregate risks with its creditors, minimizing the
chance that a recession could push it into financial distress. We show that
the institutional features of the tax code in general preclude debt from
perfectly substituting for equity in this aggregate risk-sharing role, even
when costless renegotiation is feasible. Overall, the tax bias against equity
reduces the extent to which firms insulate themselves against aggregrate
risks.
The role of equity in sharing aggregate risks leads to the prediction
that individual firm dividends should vary with macroeconomic conditions,
after controlling for the effects of all the relevant firm—level variables.
We present in support of this prediction, using several different ways to
proxy macreconomic conditions. In this regard, both our theortical and
empirical analysis may provide an insight Into why dividends traditionally
appear smooth relative to earnings at the firm—level but variable at the
aggregate level (see, e.g., Marsh and Merton,1987; and Poterba, 1987).
Regardless of whether one accepts our theory, however, we think that it is
important to ultimately explain why macroeconomic variables have signlfcant
independent predictive power in firm-level dividend equations.
27Finally, our model is too stylized to provide any quantitative Insight
into the costs of excessive leverage, Recent empirical work by Cantor (1990)
and Sharpe (1990), however, Indicates a significant impact of debt on firm
employment volatility. More work along these lines would be useful.
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31TABLE I
Econometric Models of Determinants of Firm Dividend Behavior
(Macroeconomic Conditions Represented by Year Dummies)
Regression I: Regression II: Regression III:










F test for (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
excluding
year effects
Note: The models (described In the text) were estimated by Ordinary Least
Squares using panel data from COMPUSTAT. HeteroskedastiCityCOflSlsteflt
standard errors are in parentheses. The estimated year effects are plotted In
FIgure 8.
32TABLE 2
Econometric Models of Determinants of Firm Dividend Behavior
(Macroeconomic Conditions Represented by Percentage Change in GNP)
Regression I: Regression II: Regression III:
Variable Earnings Earnings. Share Price Earnings. Taxes










7. change In 1.05 1.17 1.05
GNP (lagged) (.286) (.287) (.286)
R2 .083 .085 .083
Note: The models (described in the text) were estimated by Ordinary Least
Squares using panel data from COMPUSTAT. Heteroskedasticity—coflsiSt.ent
standard errors are in parentheses.
331-I
0
- (r - c)
Il(P0),
FIGURE 1: DETERMINATION OF P0 (NO-TAX-SUBSIDY CASE)
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